This RFC speci es an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB O cial Protocol Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
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Message Encryption Algorithms
This section identi es the alternative message encryption algorithms and modes that shall be used to encrypt message text and, when asymmetric key management is employed in an ENCRYPTED PEM message, for encryption of message signatures. Character string identi ers are assigned and any parameters required by the message encryption algorithm are de ned for incorporation in an encapsulated "DEK-Info:" header eld. Only one alternative is currently de ned in this category.
DES in CBC Mode (DES-CBC)
Message text and, if required, message signatures are encrypted using the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation. The DES algorithm is de ned in FIPS PUB 46- 1 1] , and is equivalent to the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) provided in ANSI X3. 92-1981 2] . The CBC mode of operation ofDES is de ned in FIPS PUB 81 3] , and is equivalent to those provided in ANSI X3. 106 4] and in ISO IS 8372 5] . The character string "DES-CBC" within an encapsulated PEM header eld indicates the use of this algorithm/mode combination. The input to the DES CBC encryption process shall be padded to a multiple of 8 octets, in the following manner. Let n be the length in octets of the input. Pad the input by appending 8-(n mod 8) octets to the end of the message, each having the value 8-(n mod 8), the number of octets being added. In hexadecimal, the possible paddings are: 01, 0202, 030303, 04040404, 0505050505, 060606060606, 07070707070707, and 0808080808080808. All input is padded with 1 to 8 octets to produce a multiple of 8 octets in length. The padding can be removed unambiguously after decryption. The DES CBC encryption process requires a 64-bit cryptographic key. A new, pseudorandom key shall be generated for each ENCRYPTED PEM message. Of the 64 bits, 56 are used directly by the DES CBC process, and 8 are odd parity bits, with one parity bit occupying the right-most bit of each octet. When symmetric key management is employed, the setting and checking of odd parity bits is encouraged, since these bits could detect an error in the decryption of a DES key encrypted under a symmetric key management algorithm (e.g., DES ECB). When asymmetric key management is employed, the setting of odd parity bits is encouraged, but the checking of odd parity bits is discouraged, in order to facilitate interoperability, and since an error in the decryption of a DES key can be detected by other means (e.g., an incorrect PKCS #1 encryption-block format). In all cases, the encrypted form of a DES key shall carry all 64 bits of the key, including the 8 parity bits, though those bits may have no meaning. The DES CBC encryption process also requires a 64-bit Initialization Vector (IV). A new, pseudorandom IV shall be generated for each ENCRYPTED PEM message. Section 4.3.1 of 7] provides rationale for this requirement, even given the fact that individual DES keys are generated for individual messages. The IV is transmitted with the message within an encapsulated PEM header eld. When this algorithm/mode combination is used for message text encryption, the "DEK-Info:" header eld carries exactly two arguments. The rst argument identi es the DES CBC algorithm/mode using the character string de ned above. The second argument contains the IV, represented as a contiguous string of 16 ASCII hexadecimal digits. When symmetric key management is employed with this algorithm/mode combination, a symmetrically encrypted DES key will be represented in the third argument of a "Key-Info:" header eld as a contiguous string of 16 ASCII hexadecimal digits (corresponding to a 64-bit key). To avoid any potential ambiguity regarding the ordering of the octets of a DES key that is input as a data value to another encryption process (e.g., RSAEncryption), the following holds true. The rst (or left-most displayed, if one thinks in terms of a key's "print" representation) (For purposes of discussion in this document, data values are normalized in terms of their "print" representation. For a octet stream, the " rst" octet would appear as the one on the "left", and the "last" octet would appear on the "right".) octet of the key (i.e., bits 1-8 per FIPS PUB 46-1), when considered as a data value, has numerical weight 2**56. The last (or right-most displayed) octet (i.e., bits 57-64 per FIPS PUB 46-1) has numerical weight 2**0.
Message Integrity Check Algorithms
This section identi es the alternative algorithms that shall be used to compute Message Integrity Check (MIC) values for PEM messages. Character string identi ers and ASN.1 object identi ers are assigned for incorporation in encapsulated "MIC-Info:" and "Key-Info:" header elds to indicate the choice of MIC algorithm employed. A compliant PEM implementation shall be able to process all of the alternative MIC algorithms de ned here on incoming messages. It is a sender option as to which alternative is employed on an outbound message.
RSA-MD2 Message Digest Algorithm
The RSA-MD2 message digest is computed using the algorithm de ned in RFC The RSA-MD2 message digest algorithm accepts as input a message of any length and produces as output a 16-octet quantity. When symmetric key management is employed, an RSA-MD2 MIC is encrypted by splitting the MIC into two 8-octet halves, independently encrypting each half, and concatenating the results. When symmetric key management is employed with this MIC algorithm, the symmetrically encrypted MD2 message digest is represented in a the fourth argument of a "Key-Info:" header eld as a contiguous string of 32 ASCII hexadecimal digits (corresponding to a 128-bit MD2 message digest).
To avoid any potential ambiguity regarding the ordering of the octets of an MD2 message digest that is input as a data value to another encryption process (e.g., RSAEncryption), the following holds true. The rst (or left-most displayed, if one thinks in terms of a digest's "print" representation) octet of the digest (i.e., digest 0] as speci ed in RFC 1319), when considered as an RSA data value, has numerical weight 2**120. The last (or right-most displayed) octet (i.e., digest 15] as speci ed in RFC 1319) has numerical weight 2**0.
RSA-MD5 Message Digest Algorithm
The RSA-MD5 message digest is computed using the algorithm de ned in RFC 1321 10]. The character string "RSA-MD5" within an encapsulated PEM header eld indicates the use of this algorithm. Also, as de ned in RFC 1321, the object identi er md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= f iso(1) member-body (2) US (840) rsadsi (113549) digestAlgorithm (2) 5 g identi es this algorithm. When this object identi er is used with the ASN.1 type AlgorithmIdenti er, the parameters component of that type is the ASN.1 type NULL.
The RSA-MD5 message digest algorithm accepts as input a message of any length and produces as output a 16-octet quantity. When symmetric key management is employed, an RSA-MD5 MIC is encrypted by splitting the MIC into two 8-octet halves, independently encrypting each half, and concatenating the results. When symmetric key management is employed with this MIC algorithm, the symmetrically encrypted MD5 message digest is represented in the fourth argument of a "Key-Info:" header eld as a contiguous string of 32 ASCII hexadecimal digits (corresponding to a 128-bit MD5 message digest).
To avoid any potential ambiguity regarding the ordering of the octets of a MD5 message digest that is input as an RSA data value to the RSA encryption process, the following holds true. The rst (or left-most displayed, if one thinks in terms of a digest's "print" representation) octet of the digest (i.e., the low-order octet of A as speci ed in RFC 1321), when considered as an RSA data value, has numerical weight 2**120. The last (or right-most displayed) octet (i.e., the high-order octet of D as speci ed in RFC 1321) has numerical weight 2**0.
Symmetric Key Management Algorithms
This section identi es the alternative algorithms and modes that shall be used when symmetric key management is employed, to encrypt data encryption keys (DEKs) and message integrity check (MIC) values. Character string identi ers are assigned for incorporation in encapsulated "Key-Info:" header elds to indicate the choice of algorithm employed. All alternatives presently de ned in this category correspond to di erent usage modes of the DES algorithm, rather than to other algorithms. When symmetric key management is employed, the symmetrically encrypted DEK and MIC, carried in the third and fourth arguments of a "Key-Info:" header eld, respectively, are each represented as a string of contiguous ASCII hexadecimal digits. The manner in which to use the following symmetric encryption algorithms and the length of the symmetrically encrypted DEK and MIC may vary depending on the length of the underlying DEK and MIC. Section 1, Message Encryption Algorithms, and Section 2, Message Integrity Check Algorithms, provide information on the proper manner in which a DEK and MIC, respectively, are symmetrically encrypted when the size of the DEK or MIC is not equal to the symmetric encryption algorithm's input block size. These sections also provide information on the proper format and length of the symmetrically encrypted DEK and MIC, respectively.
DES in ECB Mode (DES-ECB)
The DES algorithm in Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode 1] 3] is used for DEK and MIC encryption when symmetric key management is employed. The character string "DES-ECB" within an encapsulated PEM header eld indicates use of this algorithm/mode combination. A compliant PEM implementation supporting symmetric key management shall support this algorithm/mode combination.
DES in EDE Mode (DES-EDE)
The DES algorithm in Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt (EDE) multiple encryption mode, as de ned by ANSI X9.17 6] for encryption and decryption with pairs of 64-bit keys, may be used for DEK and MIC encryption when symmetric key management is employed. The character string "DES-EDE" within an encapsulated a PEM header eld indicates use of this algorithm/mode combination. A compliant PEM implementation supporting symmetric key management may optionally support this algorithm/mode combination.
Asymmetric Key Management Algorithms
This section identi es the alternative asymmetric keys and the alternative asymmetric key management algorithms with which those keys shall be used, namely the asymmetric encryption algorithms with which DEKs and MICs are encrypted, and the asymmetric signature algorithms with which certi cates and certi cate revocation lists (CRLs) are signed.
Asymmetric Keys
This section describes the asymmetric keys that shall be used with the asymmetric encryption algorithms and the signature algorithms described later. ASN.1 object identi ers are identi ed for incorporation in a public-key certi cate to identify the algorithm(s) with which the accompanying public key is to be employed.
RSA Keys
An RSA asymmetric key pair is comprised of matching public and private keys. An RSA public key consists of an encryption exponent e and an arithmetic modulus n, which are both public quantities typically carried in a public-key certi cate. For the value of e, Annex C to X.509 suggests the use of Fermat's Number F4 (65537 decimal, or 1+2**16) as a value "common to the whole environment in order to reduce transmission capacity and complexity of transformation", i.e., the value can be transmitted as 3 octets and at most seventeen (17) multiplications are required to e ect exponentiation. As an alternative, the number three (3) can be employed as the value for e, requiring even less octets for transmission and yielding even faster exponentiation. For purposes of PEM, the value of e shall be either F4 or the number three (3) . The use of the number three (3) for the value of e is encouraged, to permit rapid certi cate validation.
An RSA private key consists of a decryption exponent d, which should be kept secret, and the arithmetic modulus n. Other values may be stored with a private key to facilitate e cient private key operations (see PKCS #1 11]). For purposes of PEM, the modulus n may vary in size from 508 to 1024 bits. Two ASN.1 object identi ers have been de ned to identify RSA public keys. In Annex H of X.509 8], the object identi er rsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= f joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds (5) algorithm (8) encryptionAlgorithm (1) (2) US (840) rsadsi (113549) pkcs (1) pkcs-1(1) 1 g is de ned to identify both an RSA public key and the RSAEncryption process. There are no parameters de ned in conjunction with this object identi er, hence, when it is used with the ASN.1 type AlgorithmIdenti er, the parameters component of that type is the ASN.1 type NULL. A compliant PEM implementation may optionally generate an RSA public-key certi cate that identi es the enclosed RSA public key (within the SubjectPublicKeyInformation component) with either the "rsa" or the "rsaEncryption" object identi er. Use of the "rsa" object identi er is encouraged, since it is, in some sense, more generic in its identi cation of a key, without indicating how the key will be used. However, to facilitate interoperability, a compliant PEM implementation shall accept RSA public-key certi cates that identify the enclosed RSA public key with either the "rsa" or the "rsaEncryption" object identi er. In all cases, an RSA public key identi ed in an RSA public-key certi cate with either the "rsa" or "rsaEncryption" object identi er, shall be used according to the procedures de ned below for asymmetric encryption algorithms and asymmetric signature algorithms.
Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms
This section identi es the alternative algorithms that shall be used when asymmetric key management is employed, to encrypt DEKs and MICs. Character string identi ers are assigned for incorporation in "MIC-Info:" and "Key-Info:" header elds to indicate the choice of algorithm employed. Only one alternative is presently de ned in this category.
RSAEncryption
The RSAEncryption public-key encryption algorithm, de ned in PKCS #1 11], is used for DEK and MIC encryption when asymmetric key management is employed. The character string "RSA" within a "MIC-Info:" or "Key-Info:" header eld indicates the use of this algorithm. All PEM implementations supporting asymmetric key management shall support this algorithm. As described in PKCS #1, all quantities input as data values to the RSAEncryption process shall be properly justi ed and padded to the length of the modulus prior to the encryption process. In general, an RSAEncryption input value is formed by concatenating a leading NULL octet, a block type BT, a padding string PS, a NULL octet, and the data quantity D, that is, RSA input value = 0x00 || BT || PS || 0x00 || D. To prepare a DEK for RSAEncryption, the PKCS #1 "block type 02" encryptionblock formatting scheme is employed. The block type BT is a single octet containing the value 0x02 and the padding string PS is one or more octets (enough octets to make the length of the complete RSA input value equal to the length of the modulus) each containing a pseudorandomly generated, non-zero value. For multiple recipient messages, a di erent, pseudorandom padding string should be used for each recipient. The data quantity D is the DEK itself, which is rightjusti ed within the RSA input such that the last (or rightmost displayed, if one thinks in terms of the "print" representation) octet of the DEK is aligned with the right-most, or least-signi cant, octet of the RSA input. Proceeding to the left, each of the remaining octets of the DEK, up through the rst (or left-most displayed) octet, are each aligned in the next more signi cant octet of the RSA input. To prepare a MIC for RSAEncryption, the PKCS #1 "block type 01" encryptionblock formatting scheme is employed. The block type BT is a single octet containing the value 0x01 and the padding string PS is one or more octets (enough octets to make the length of the complete RSA input value equal to the length of the modulus) each containing the value 0xFF. The data quantity D is comprised of the MIC and the MIC algorithm identi er which are ASN.1 encoded as the following sequence. 
Asymmetric Signature Algorithms
This section identi es the alternative algorithms which shall be used to asymmetrically sign certi cates and certi cate revocation lists (CRLs) in accordance with the SIGNED macro de ned in Annex G of X.509. ASN.1 object identi ers are identi ed for incorporation in certi cates and CRLs to indicate the choice of algorithm employed. Only one alternative is presently de ned in this category.
md2WithRSAEncryption
The md2WithRSAEncryption signature algorithm is used to sign certi cates and CRLs. The algorithm is de ned in PKCS #1 11] . It combines the RSA-MD2 message digest algorithm described here in Section 2.2 with the RSAEncryption asymmetric encryption algorithm described here in Section 4.2.1. As de ned in PKCS #1, the ASN.1 object identi er md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= f iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi (113549) There is some ambiguity in X.509 regarding the de nition of the SIGNED macro and, in particular, the representation of a signature in a certi cate or a CRL. The interpretation selected for PEM requires that the data to be signed (in our case, an MD2 message digest) is rst ASN.1 encoded as an OCTET STRING and the result is encrypted (in our case, using RSAEncryption) to form the signed quantity, which is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING.
Descriptive Grammar
; Addendum to PEM BNF representation, using RFC 822 notation ; Provides speci cation for o cial PEM cryptographic algorithms, modes, identi ers and formats.
; Imports <hexchar> and <encbin> from RFC 1113ID] <dekalgid> ::= "DES-CBC" <ikalgid> ::= "DES-EDE" j "DES-ECB" j "RSA" <sigalgid> ::= "RSA" <micalgid> ::= "RSA-MD2" j "RSA-MD5" These patents are stated by PKP to cover all known methods of practicing the art of Public Key encryption, including the variations collectively known as El Gamal. Public Key Partners has provided written assurance to the Internet Society that parties will be able to obtain, under reasonable, nondiscriminatory terms, the right to use the technology covered by these patents. This assurance is documented in RFC 1170 titled "Public Key Standards and Licenses". A copy of the written assurance dated April 20, 1990, may be obtained from the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA). The Internet Society, Internet Architecture Board, Internet Engineering Steering Group and the Corporation for National Research Initiatives take no position on the validity or scope of the patents and patent applications, nor on the appropriateness of the terms of the assurance. The Internet Society and other groups mentioned above have not made any determination as to any other intellectual property rights which may apply to the practice of this standard. Any further consideration of these matters is the user's own responsibility.
